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Abstract 
This paper examines the changes in the interdependence between sovereign and bank credit 
risk, that were noticed, after the announcement of the voluntary exchange program of Greek 
bonds, with the participation of the private sector (Private Sector Involvement - PSI). More 
precisely, we investigate the progress of the credit default swaps (CDS) of eight eurozone 
countries and of twenty-one banking institutions, for the period of January 2009 to May 2014. 
We divide the sample into two sub-periods, based on the announcement of the program. We 
apply Hsiao's methodology (1981), in order to ascertain the causality which is observed between 
the CDS series and potential changes in their relationship, due to the implementation of the PSI. 
We identify limited causality relations between countries and banks of the sample examined, in 
the second sub-period, while the size of the interaction is reduced in the same period. After 
developing a Difference-in-Difference model, we confirm the weakening of causal relationships 
between the CDS series studied, for the period, after the announcement of the PSI. Our results 
suggest that the implementation of the PSI has contributed to the limitation of the 
interdependence between the CDS spreads of the sovereigns and banks in the period that 
follows. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007, began in the US, and quickly expanded to the other side of the 
Atlantic -particularly in the European area- causing a systemic crisis in European banks. This was 
caused by the dramatic reduction of the liquidity in the interbank money market. Especially, 
countries such as Spain and Ireland, received intense pressure from the credit crunch created, 
due to the fact, that their banking system was significantly supported by the real estate market. 
The collapse of the housing market and the further significant decline in economic activity, 
resulted in the bankruptcy of many of the countries' banking institutions, since banks had 
granted huge mortgage loans. Hence, this dramatic increase of private debt turned into a fiscal 
crisis for these countries. 
 This crisis has highlighted the critical and unique role of the banking sector to ensure the 
stability and development, not only of the global financial system, but, that of individual 
countries as well. Banks, which in the years before the crisis, had taken considerable risks in 
order to achieve higher profits, are now faced with new conditions and challenges. Their 
profitability declined significantly, and many encountered record losses that obliged them to 
turn to government bailout programs, so in order to ensure their operation. 
 Specifically, after the 2007 financial crisis, concerns about the health of the European 
Union (EU) banking system escalated as a result of the direct exposure of European banks to 
troubled sovereigns. These are reinforced by a weaker growth outlook for the EU region, and, 
stressed global funding markets. Furthermore, as the new regulatory standards are put into 
effect, European banks and EU lawmakers started to realize the great challenges banks now face 
in order to comply with the increased capital and liquidity requirements. Against the backdrop of 
continuing financial market turbulence, falling lending volume, compounded by exposures to 
distressed sovereigns, banks find it even more difficult to remain profitable. This brings into the 
forefront the issue of bankruptcy. Consequently, stronger emphasis is put on the importance of 
economic support from the government sector to the banking sector1 in order to meet their 
obligations, and, to prevent possible bankruptcy. This action could cause a domino effect, with 
unpredictable consequences, for the banking sector, and the European economy as a whole. 
 On the other hand, the immense liquidity problems that several countries of the 
eurozone faced, obliged countries, such as, Greece, Portugal, and Italy, which had significant 
                                                          
1
 The different government assistance programs for the financial sector are divided into four categories, 
according to Alter and Schuler, (2012): "capital injections, guarantees for banks liabilities, asset support 
programs, and deposit insurance". 
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fiscal problems over a long period of time, to resort to the help of international organizations 
(International Monetary Fund -IMF, European Central Bank-ECB). This was done in order for 
these countries to be able to service their debt, and to rescue the banks from a systemic 
collapse. These conditions, combined with the unfavorable situation of the financial sector, 
lacked the necessary funds that would allow for its reversal, therefore making it necessary for 
the need to absorb public funds. For this purpose, countries provided unlimited liquidity, which 
in turn, restricted their fiscal condition. 
 As far as the banks were concerned, and especially the European ones, they came under 
strong pressure, due to the rising sovereign risk. This was mainly because of the huge amount of 
public debt, which they held in their portfolios. This, combined with the lack of liquidity that also 
prevailed, and, with the strong dependence on the Central Bank, caused an immediate increase 
in financing costs. Furthermore, the holding of public debt resulted in the deterioration of the 
balance sheets of banks which held government bonds, as well as, the flight of significant 
amount of capital owing to the collapse of the investors' confidence in the banking sector. 
 Many studies (Ejsing & Lemke (2009), Bolton & Jeanne (2011), Acharya et al. (2011), 
Alter & Schueler (2010), among others) have underlined the interdependence between 
sovereign and bank credit risk, which significantly increased, especially, during the recent euro 
area sovereign debt crisis of 2009. Moreover, they have observed various transmission channels 
of credit risk between sovereigns and banks. While at the beginning of the debt crisis we noted 
the transmission of credit risk from banks to the states, after the disclosure of the new data on 
the amount of the Greek debt (Nov 2009), the previous relationship was reversed. Subsequently, 
we observe a credit risk transfer from the states to the financial sector. 
 More precisely, the possibility of Greece's bankruptcy would directly affect banks of 
other countries that keep significant amounts of Greek debt in their possession. This leads to the 
rise of the bank credit risk and the sovereign credit risk of the respective countries, since they 
will have to support their national banking system in order to avoid a contingent collapse. In 
addition to this, the increasing risk, due to a possible insolvency of Greek banks, is transferred to 
foreign creditors who have invested in the Greek banking system, and thus, causing a constant 
increase in the probability of transmitting the risk to foreign countries. 
 As a result of the above situation, we see a rapid growth in the yields of government 
bonds, as well as in the spreads of sovereign and bank CDS (Credit Default Swaps). A number of 
important measures, have therefore, been adopted by European political and economic leaders. 
Among these, is the program of the voluntary exchange of Greek bonds, with the participation of 
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the private sector (Private Sector Involvement -PSI- 10/2011), and the banks' capability for direct 
capitalization by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM - 06/2012)2.  
 The official aim of the PSI was the relief of the Greek debt (reducing the debt to GDP 
ratio to 120% by 20203), with the transfer of part of this debt to the private sector4, and 
consequently to many private financial institutions which held a significant amount of public 
debt in their portfolios. This was done, in order to ensure the sustainability of the Greek 
economy and to guarantee its position in the eurozone5. The PSI is perceived as a message to the 
private sector, for the need for rational and safer management of funds. Trust in investment in 
government bonds weakened. Today, the challenge for policy-makers, is not just to ensure that 
the debt becomes sustainable, but, to do so in a way that prevents future financial crises. 
 The purpose of our paper is to empirically investigate the relationship between the 
sovereign and bank credit risk for the period of January 2009 to May 2014. Our study extends 
the previous research on the interdependence between sovereign and bank credit risk, by 
considering new factors in the analysis that have not been used before. In particular, we examine 
the impact of the implementation of the PSI program, in the interdependence between 
sovereign and bank credit risk, observing the fluctuation of credit default derivatives of eight 
eurozone6 countries and twenty-one banking institutions7 of these countries. To do so, we 
consider two sub-periods, the period before (01/01/2009-26/10/2011), and the period after the 
                                                          
2 
Other measures were the unlimited purchase from the ECB of government bonds from the secondary 
market for the countries having recourse to the support mechanism (09/2012), the impairment of private 
deposits in Cyprus (03/2013), and the significant reduction of the interest rates by the ECB (09/2014), 
which aimed primarily at reducing the credit risk of countries and banks. 
3
 Euro Summit Statement on October 26, 2011. 
4
 The statement of the Hellenic Ministry of Finance on February 24, 2012, specifies the terms of the PSI 
program. The new bonds would necessarily be governed by English law. Specifically, "the exchange offers 
and/or consent solicitations will permit private sector holders to exchange bonds selected to participate in 
PSI for:  
(i) new bonds to be issued by the Hellenic Republic on the PSI settlement date having a face amount equal 
to 31.5% of the face amount of their exchanged bonds,  
(ii) European Financial Stability Facility notes with a maturity date of two years or less from the PSI 
settlement date and having a face amount equal to 15% of the face amount of their exchanged bonds, and 
(iii) detachable GDP-linked securities issued by the Hellenic Republic having a notional amount equal to 
the face amount of each holder’s new bonds. 
On the PSI settlement date, the Hellenic Republic will also deliver short-term EFSF notes in discharge of all 
unpaid interest accrued up to 24 February 2012 on exchanged bonds. The Hellenic Republic will not, 
however, deliver any EFSF notes to holders in the United States of America, who will instead be paid the 
cash proceeds realized from the sale of the EFSF notes they would otherwise have received. " 
5 
It is the first time, where a eurozone country fails to meet its obligations, and there is now a possibility of 
defaulting under certain circumstances. 
6,7
 The countries and the banking institutions of the sample are referred in Table 1. 
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announcement of the PSI (27/10/2011-30/05/2014). Furthermore, we intend to see whether this 
program could be used in the future in similar crises, so in order to reduce contagion and 
systemic risk. 
 This paper contributes to the existing literature on the contagion effects between 
sovereign and bank default risk, by examining to what extent a program such as the PSI, may 
have altered the interdependence between sovereign and bank credit risk -by employing the 
respective CDS spreads. We present evidence that the implementation of the PSI has contributed 
to the restriction of the interdependence between CDS spreads of governments and banks in the 
period following the program. Consequently, we infer that the PSI is a process, which could be 
used in the future, by competent authorities, in order to reduce contagion and systemic risk. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2, reviews the existing 
literature on the relationship between sovereign and bank credit risk. Section 3, describes the 
data used in the empirical analysis, while Section 4, presents the methodology employed. 
Section 5, discusses the empirical results of this research. Finally, Section 6, summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There is vast literature concerning the cross-country transmission of credit risk. In the last 
decade, a large part of this literature has concentrated on the interdependence between 
different sovereign markets. Kalbaska and Gatowski (2012), examine the transmission of credit 
risk between nine EU countries, with the use of CDS spreads for the period from 08/2005 until 
09/2010. They argue that the interdependencies between countries have increased significantly 
with the spread of the global financial crisis, compared to the pre-crisis period. Finally, they 
conclude that countries facing the most serious economic problems in the eurozone - Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain (known as PIIGS) - have a lesser ability to cause contagion, with 
respect to the powerful countries of the European Union. 
 By studying the co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads, after the onset of the Greek 
crisis of October 2009, Andenmatten and Brill (2011) look for the existence of contagion, by 
means of a bivariate control, for thirty-nine countries worldwide. They detect the existence of 
interdependence, as well as contagion, among European countries. Gentile and Giordano (2012), 
study the contagion of credit risk after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (2008), and during the 
European debt crisis, drawing on data from the bond and stock markets. They infer that causality 
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has changed with the occurrence of the crises, in relation to periods prior to these, thus, finding 
the contagion of credit risk among eight different European countries 
 After the global crisis of 2007 broke out, when the role of the banking system was 
catalytic, empirical research in cross-country studies has focused on the relationship between 
sovereign and bank credit risk. The results of these studies converge, that this relation has gone 
beyond the simple interaction, and, has developed into interdependence and contagion8 
between countries and banks.  
 Lahmann (2012), identifies the interdependence between sovereign and bank credit risk, 
by analyzing the relation between sovereign and bank CDS spreads at a global level, for the 
period of October 2005 to April 2011. He shows that, after the outbreak of the debt crisis, 
interactions between CDS have intensified, while the effect of bank risk to sovereign is stronger. 
This indicates that countries are exposed to the contingent liabilities of the banking sector, due 
to, the huge financial support being provided. In their study, Ejsing and Lemke (2011), investigate 
the default risk of governments and banks of ten Euro area countries. They identify a significant 
interdependence between public and private risk, by using a common risk factor (iTraxx index of 
non-financial CDS premia). After the date of the announcement of the bank rescue packages, 
which was considered as a structural break point, the bank CDS spreads decreased, while the 
corresponding sovereign CDS spreads increased.  
 Following a similar line of research, Tamakoshi and Hamori (2013) analyze the causality 
observed between the index of CDS of the banking sector of the eurozone, and the sovereign 
CDS spreads of Greece, for the period of 2008 to 2011. Before the debt crisis in Europe, they 
identify the transmission of credit risk only by bank CDS to CDS spreads of Greece. During the 
crisis, however, the situation is different as there is a significant influence of Greek sovereign CDS 
spreads to bank CDS.  
 Many authors, such as Alter and Schuler (2011) among them emphasize -by employing 
CDS spreads of six eurozone countries and their domestic banks- that in the period before the 
bailout of financial institutions by the states, the sovereign credit risk was influenced mainly by 
the banks' credit risk. However, the respective results were reversed in the period after the 
bailout of the banking sector. In another study Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2011), examine 
the effect of bidirectional feedback between sovereign and bank credit risk for the period 2007 
                                                          
8
 The World Bank regards that contagion is observed, when the transmission of shocks between the 
countries increase in times of crisis, with respect to the corresponding transmissions in tranquil periods 
(www.econ.worldbank.org). 
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to 2011 of the eurozone countries. Initially, they observe the banks' exposure to the risk of 
foreign countries. Consequently, they find that the greatest concern stems from their cross-
border exposure to the risk of the private sector. In addition, they provide empirical evidence 
that the government rescue packages towards the banking sector, reinforce the interconnection 
between bank credit risk and the corresponding sovereign risk, while there is a rise in sovereign 
CDS spreads, and, a reduction in bank CDS, respectively. 
 Dieckmann and Plank (2010), underline a private-to-public risk transfer in eighteen 
European countries, which have taken stringent measures during the crisis, in order to restore 
financial stability. They point out that the risk transfer was greater for the countries which were 
more exposed to their financial system, in the pre-crisis period, and, for those countries which 
were members of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In contrast, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010), highlight the reversal risk channel, by studying an international sample of 
countries and banks. They conclude that bank CDS spreads rose remarkably in the countries with 
weak fiscal conditions. This occurs because these countries cannot provide adequate assistance 
in order to bail out their financial sector. 
 
3. Data 
In order to study the interdependence observed in the relationship between the sovereign and 
bank default risk in our sample, we use, as a financial instrument, the daily prices of the senior 
unsecured sovereign CDS spreads on 5-year government bonds -considered as those with higher 
liquidity9-, as well as, the respective senior unsecured bank CDS spreads. The sample period 
ranges from January 1st, 2009 until May 30th, 2014. The higher the value of CDS spreads, the 
less likelihood, a country or a banking institution, is able to meet its obligations. 
 The CDS premiums are considered in the current literature, as an effective measure 
among other credit risk measures10. A CDS is a security contract between two parties, the buyer 
and the seller. The ultimate aim of a CDS is to transfer the credit risk from the buyer, who 
purchases the contract, by paying a fixed fee -risk premium (CDS spread)- to the seller of the 
contract. The seller, is in turn compensated for the risk undertaken, in the event of failure of the 
buyer to fulfill the debt obligations. The seller, is obliged to compensate the buyer, if a credit 
event occurs, at the nominal value of the assets which he holds, or, to pay the difference 
                                                          
9
 Hull, Nelken & White, (2004). 
10
 Fontana & Scheicher, (2010). 
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between the nominal value, and the market value. The bankruptcy of a country, or of a banking 
institution, is one such event. The CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. 
 We draw daily data on CDS spreads, from Thomson Reuters Datastream (CMA- Credit 
Market Analysis) and Bloomberg, in order to capture the dynamic changes occurring in the 
relationship under study. Our sample consists of these countries in the eurozone, experiencing 
major debt problems during the recent financial crisis, and, which are considered as the weak 
link, and the source of destabilization of the economic situation in the euro area. More 
specifically, these countries are Portugal (PT), Italy (IT), Ireland (IR), Greece (GR), and Spain (SP), 
known by the acronym PIIGS. Moreover, in our sample, we also include, the Netherlands (NL), 
France (FR) and Germany (DE). These countries possessed in their portfolios major shares of 
PIIGS' debt. The selection of the sample of banks in each country, is based, both, on their total 
assets, and on the availability of the data for the period under review. Table 1 presents the 
selected banking institutions. 
 The data is transformed into natural logarithms, so as not to have a great impact from 
the reaction of the PIIGS. Therefore, an equal variation in CDS spreads of Greece and the 
Netherlands, will not have the same magnitude. In our sample, taking the logarithmic values11 
becomes important because of the wide variations in the values of spreads for some countries 
and banks, during the period of analysis. Turning now to bank risk premiums, we weigh the bank 
CDS spreads of our sample by using their total liabilities for each year. We do this in order to 
calculate the index of bank CDS spreads for each country examined. 
 To understand the possible change in the interaction among sovereign and bank credit 
risk of our sample, as a result of the PSI program, we divide the reporting period into two sub-
periods. Thus, the structural point is determined exogenously, October 27, 2011 is the day, after 
the announcement of the decision of the European Summit, for the implementation of the 
voluntary exchange program of Greek bonds, with the participation of the private sector. 
 Figures 1 and 2 below, illustrate the evolution of the examined logged CDS series during 
the sample period. The red vertical line indicates the date that separates our sample. In these 
figures, we observe that the Greek spreads rose to exceptional levels, particularly during the 
period of the PSI program. This was because uncertainty was pervasive in the derivatives' market 
(PSI completed on 25/04/12). We see similar variation in the government CDS spreads of the 
other countries in our sample during the period of the program. From the study of the two 
                                                          
11
 Forte & Pena, (2009). 
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figures, we note that CDS spreads of most countries and banks, during the relevant period, were 
close to their maximum levels. 
 
 
 
 
 Tables 2-5 display the summary statistics of sovereign and bank CDS spreads of our 
sample. We observe, that the average of the spreads increase significantly during the second 
period, after the announcement of the PSI, except for those of Ireland, Germany and the Irish 
banks. The average sovereign CDS of our sample for the first period is 253.38bps, while for the 
second period, it is 845.76bps, which is mainly due to the surge of Greek risk premium. The 
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corresponding averages without Greece, are 160.93bps and 207.86. The bank CDS spreads 
averages are 173.87bps and 221.03bps, for the first and for the second period respectively. 
 The results are similar, in terms of standard deviation, of the time series in the two study 
periods. This fact is an indication of intensified volatility, uncertainty, and risk in the second 
study period. Whereas, for the Irish, the Portuguese and the Dutch banks, the standard deviation 
is reduced during the second period. 
 Overall, we observe that the sovereign CDS spreads are at a higher level than that of the 
corresponding bank CDS for the two sub-periods, with the exception of the Irish banks for both 
sub-periods, and the German banks in the second period. This reflects that there is higher 
government credit risk, during the European debt crisis, in relation to that of the banking sector. 
Similar are the results of the standard deviation, except for that of Irish banks. 
 Regarding the high prices of kurtosis, we conclude that the CDS spreads change 
remarkably, quite often, while this is indicative of the increased probability of observing outliers, 
particularly in the first period, and, that there is a total rise of credit risk. We notice positive 
skewness for all time series, except for the Italian bank CDS in the second period. Consequently, 
there are a few high outliers in relation to the large population of low prices, which is an 
indicative element of the turmoil observed, especially, in the first period. 
 Observing the results of pair-wise correlations of sovereign and bank CDS spreads, in 
their logarithmic first-differences, in Table 6, we find significant correlations, greater than 0.3 for 
all concerned relations -with the exception of Greece and Ireland- during the second period. In 
addition, we conclude that there is a considerable reduction in the correlations between CDS 
spreads during the second period for the entire sample. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Econometric specification 
In order to examine the interdependence, which is possibly observed, between sovereign and 
banking sector credit spreads in our sample, we do not apply the known Granger-causality tests, 
which can be found broadly in the relevant literature. We conduct our analysis by employing 
Hsiao's methodology (1981)12, which is based on the Granger method of causality (1969), and on 
the use of the Akaike's Final Prediction Error (FPE) criterion (1969)13.  
                                                          
12
 The same methodology was followed in the study of Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013), entitled 
"Granger Causality in Peripheral EMU Debt Markets: A Dynamic Approach", in which they examined the 
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 Hsiao considers that the hardest part, in a multiple autoregressive process, is defining 
the maximum number of lags. Thus, the method which he proposes, allows each variable to be 
inserted in the examined equation with a different lag, according to the minimum FPE criterion. 
This approach aims to reduce the number of the parameters under estimation, so in order to 
balance the bias and inefficiency problems of the parameterized model. This option, according to 
Hsiao, is equivalent to applying an F-test with varying significance levels.  
 We seek to ascertain the existence and the direction of causality, both, before and after, 
the announcement of the PSI program. The methodology is as follows: 
 Let Y and X two stationary variables in levels (i.e. I(0)). 
1. First, we consider Y as a one-dimensional autoregressive process: 
 
              
 
       (1) 
 
We calculate the FPEs, with the number of lags ranging from 1 to K. We choose the lag k, where 
1≤k≤K, which implies the minimum FPE:    
 
 FPEY(κ,0)=(T+κ+1)/(Τ-κ-1)*RSS/T
14,15 (2) 
 
2. Then, we regard Y as a controlled variable with lag equal to k, and X as a manipulated variable: 
 
                      
 
   
 
       (3) 
 
We re-calculate the FPEs of Y, changing the lags of X from 1 to L, and determine the lag λ, where 
1≤λ≤ , which corresponds to the minimum value of FPE: 
 
 FPEY(κ,λ)=(T+κ+λ+1)/(Τ-κ-λ-1)*RSS/T (4) 
 
3. Subsequently, we compare the FPE calculated in step 1, (FPEY(k,0)), with the corresponding 
FPE calculated in step 2, (FPEY(k,λ)). If (FPEY(k,0))>(FPEY(k,λ)), then the optimal model for the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
interdependence between the eurozone countries, by using the 10-year government bonds, for the period 
1999-2010. 
13
 According to Hsiao this methodology "is used to impose restrictions in order to capture empirical 
regularities which remain hidden to standard procedures." 
14
 T: the total number of the observations, and RSS: Residual Sum of Squares of regression (1). 
15
 The FPEs are calculated on the assumption that the residuals are white noise. 
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prediction of Y is that comprising k lags of Y and λ of X. In this case, we conclude that X causes Y. 
Otherwise, if (FPEY(k,0))<(FPEY(k,λ)), then Y is calculated as a one-dimensional autoregressive 
process. 
 
4. We repeat the process considering X as a controlled variable and Y as a manipulated one. 
 
 If our variables Y and X have a unit root in levels, but, they are stationary in the first-
differences (i.e. are integrated of order one, I(1)), we repeat the above procedure, but now, in 
order to ascertain, whether there is a causal relationship between the Δ  and ΔΧ. If our variables 
are not cointegrated, we consider the following equations: 
 
                   
 
    (5) 
 
                         
 
   
 
       (6) 
 
 Finally, if we find out, that the under consideration time series, is linked with a common 
stochastic trend (cointegrated), then in the equations (5) and (6) we have to include an error 
correction term (ECT)16: 
 
 Δ                         
 
    (7) 
 
  Δ                                 
 
      
 
    (8) 
 
 Hence, with the help of the minimum calculated FPEs, we determine the difference 
FPE(k,0) - FPE(k,λ) for the time series, in which we observed causality, both before and after the 
announcement of the PSI, in order to find possible differentiation in its magnitude. From the size 
of the change of causality, we are able to see if there is interaction, and the relative size of it, 
between sovereign and bank default risk -as a consequence of the PSI program- assessing the 
impact of this program on CDS spreads of our sample. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 ECT: the error-correction term from the cointegrating equation Yt=α+ Χt. 
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4.2. Bivariate cointegration analysis 
In order to apply Hsiao's methodology described above, with the purpose of ascertaining the 
existence of interdependence between the sovereign, and, the corresponding bank CDS spreads, 
we have to, initially, test if the time series is stationary by means of the known unit root tests for 
both periods. We run the Phillips-Perron (PP17) test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF18) test, 
and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS19) test. In the KPSS test, unlike the others, the null 
hypothesis checks the existence of stationarity. We consider that the time series has a unit root, 
when at least two of the above tests, demonstrate the existence of a unit root at a 5% 
significance level. 
 If the series has a unit root, in order to achieve stationarity, we receive the logarithmic 
first-differences, and we repeat the unit root tests. If we conclude, after the second line of tests, 
that the time series is integrated of order one, i.e. I(1), then we check the existence of 
cointegration. We use the Johansen's tests (1995), concretely the trace test, and the maximum 
eigenvalue test, in order to estimate the number of cointegrated relationships. The time series is 
cointegrated, if at least one of the tests proves the existence of cointegration at a 5% significance 
level. 
 We select the number of lags, which we use for conducting the cointegration tests, 
based on the information criterion of Hannan-Quinn (HQIC). The selection of the appropriate lag 
length should be performed very carefully, as there is the risk of biased estimation of the 
cointegrating vector20. 
 When performing the trace test, the null hypothesis (H0) is r≤r0 for r0=0,1,...n-1 where n is 
the number of variables. Therefore, it examines that the maximum number of cointegrating 
vectors are r0, versus the alternative (H1) which are more than r0, H1: r0<r≤n. In our study, in 
which we examine two variables (n = 2) -sovereign and bank CDS series-, we consecutively check 
for r0=0 and r0=1. The control stops at the value of r0 that Ho is accepted. 
 Regarding the application of the maximum eigenvalue tests, the Ho hypothesis is the 
same. However, the H1 assumes that there are exact r0+1 cointegrating vectors. It should be 
noted that, if, after performing these tests, we find that r0=n, this means that the variables are 
stationary in levels (i.e. I(0)). We choose, during these tests, the possibility of linear trend, which 
is more plausible in reflecting the generating mechanism of the data.  
                                                          
17
 Phillips & Perron, (1988). 
18
 Dickey & Fuller, (1979). 
19
 Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt & Shin, (1992). 
20
 Jacobson, (1995). 
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4.3. Difference-in-Difference model 
The Difference-in-Difference (DID) method, that we develop, aims to detect the change of the 
effect of bank CDS premiums to the respective sovereign, before, and after, the announcement 
of the PSI program, as well as, the corresponding change of the effect of sovereign CDS in bank 
CDS spreads. For this purpose, initially, we form a dummy variable, TD (Timedummy), which 
takes the value 0 for the period before the announcement, and, the value 1 for the period 
afterwards. The coefficient of the variable TD expresses the increase or decrease, on average, of 
the short-term impact of the change in the explanatory variable to the response variable, after 
the notification of the program, which we are considering. 
 Subsequently, we create a new dummy variable, INT (Interaction), in order to observe 
the change in the coefficient of the independent variable after the announcement of the PSI 
program. The coefficient of the dummy variable INT (slope) reflects the change of the effect 
observed, (if it is statistically significant), after the announcement of the program, from the 
independent to the dependent variable. Specifically, we examine the following equation: 
 
 ΔYit =δ0 +δ1*TD+δ2*INT+δ3ΔΧit + uit (9) 
                                 where:  ΙΝΤ=TD*ΔΧi t                                                                                                                                                        (10) 
 
 The examination of the above equation assumes that our variables are not cointegrated. 
We check the time series of our sample, for the entire study period, by the Johansen's 
cointegration tests described above. If we find the existence of a long-term equilibrium 
relationship between the time series, we adjust the equation (9), so that we include the error-
correction term. The new equation that we study in this case is the following: 
 
 ΔYit= δ0 + δ1* TD + δ2* INT + δ3ΔΧit +δ4 Ζt-1 +uit (11) 
    where: Ζt : the residual of Yit =  0 +  1* TD +  3Χit + uit                                                                       (12) 
 
 We allow the introduction of the dummy variable TD in equation (12), in order to shift 
the constant term from the cointegrating equation. Thus, the cointegrating equation changes, 
after the date of the announcement of the PSI, once we have included the TD variable in the 
long-term relationship. Therefore, if the resulting residuals are distributed normally, this means 
that there is cointegration with varying equilibrium. The coefficient  1 denotes the change to the 
constant term of the long-term relationship, that we are considering. If it is positive, this means 
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that the constant term of the long-term equation changes, in the value of  1. We conclude, that 
both variables deviate further between them, hence, the distance of the time series increases on 
average, after the announcement of the PSI. In this case, the equilibrium point Yit, is on average 
higher for various values of Xit. The results are the opposite if  1 is negative.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Interdependence between CDS spreads 
In order to apply Hsiao's methodology for testing the causality, as described in sub-section 4.1., 
we examine the CDS series for the existence of stationarity in levels -in log prices- for both sub-
periods, by applying ADF, PP and KPSS tests. We note, that all the series have a unit root. By 
repeating this process, using at this time, the first-differences of the log prices of the CDS 
spreads, we infer that our series are stationary. Audit results from the unit root tests, which we 
performed, are presented in detail in Tables 7-10. 
 Tables 11 and 12, analytically display, the results of Johansen's trace and maximum 
eigenvalue tests, after controlling for the existence of cointegration, for both sub-periods. The 
lag length is specified according to the information criterion of Hannan-Quinn (HQIC), separately, 
for each sub-period. We allow the existence of a linear trend in the data (in levels), while the 
cointegrating equations may be stationary around a non-zero mean. The countries, where a 
long-run relationship is observed, between the sovereign and the banking sector credit spreads 
in the first period, are Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and France. On the contrary, the CDS 
series for Italy, the Netherlands and Germany diverge in the long-term. The results are different 
in the second period, as we find the existence of one cointegrating relation, only, between 
Spain's sovereign CDS spreads and Spanish bank CDS spreads (r = 1). 
 After conducting the necessary tests, we can proceed to examine the possible 
interrelation between sovereign and bank credit risk. Tables 13 and 14, present the results after 
calculating the FPEs, which are estimated based on equations (3) and (4), in the case that the 
series are not cointegrated, and based on equations (5) and (6), if there is a long-run 
relationship. Therefore, we include the error-correction term21. 
 During the first period, we find the existence of bidirectional causality between CDS 
spreads for all countries and banks in the sample, with the exception of, the Portuguese and Irish 
                                                          
21
 We specify the maximum number of lags K equal to 25. Hsiao, in his study (1981) defines this number 
equals 15, but he uses quarterly data in his research. 
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banks, which do not affect the CDS of the respective countries. Therefore, in a total of fourteen 
possible causal relationships, causality is not detected, in only, two of the cases. 
 During the second period, after the announcement of the PSI, we observe a limitation of 
causal relations from sixteen to ten. More precisely, we do not find causality from the 
Portuguese and Italian banks to Portugal and Italy, respectively. Moreover, there is no 
interaction between the credit risk of the Netherlands and the Dutch banks, and of Germany 
with its own banks. 
 It is only in the Portuguese banks' CDS spreads, that we note the absence of causality to 
the respective sovereign CDS, in both sub-periods. On the contrary, we detect interaction 
between sovereign and bank credit risk for Greece, Spain and France, in both sub-periods. 
 Subsequently, in order to determine a possible variation in the size of causality -in the 
relations in which we found causality in the two periods-, we compute the difference of the 
minimum FPEs identified in Steps 1 and 2, FPE(k,0)-FPE(k,λ). By studying the results shown in 
Table 15, we infer that after the implementation of the PSI program, there is a reduction in the 
influence of Greek and Spanish bank CDS spreads on sovereign CDS of Greece and Spain, 
respectively. Similar are the results, concerning the effect of sovereign CDS of Greece, Portugal, 
Italy, Spain and Ireland to the respective bank CDS spreads. However, we find opposite results 
for France and French banks, in which there is an increase in the interdependence between 
them. Interpreting this result, this is probably due to the fact that French banks kept in their 
portfolios a large amount of Greek bonds during the implementation of the PSI, resulting in the 
strengthening of bank credit risk, and, its interaction with sovereign credit risk. 
 
5.2. Difference-in-Difference results 
Afterwards, we examine how the causality varies between CDS spreads, after the announcement 
of the implementation of the PSI, but, with a different methodology in relation to sub-section 
5.1.. Our aim is to verify the results of the interdependence between sovereign and bank CDS, 
that we have already found, by applying Hsiao's methodology. 
 Initially, we define the cointegrated time series during the period from 01/01/2009 until 
30/05/2014. We find the existence of a long-term equilibrium between sovereign CDS spreads of 
Portugal, Italy, Spain and Ireland, and the respective bank CDS. Table 16, presents the results 
obtained from the study, of both, the short-term and the long-term interdependencies of the 
sovereign and bank CDS spreads of the sample -with the Difference-in-Difference methodology- 
after assessing the equations (9) and (11), respectively. 
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 By determining the coefficient of the dummy variable INT (Interaction) for each relation 
between CDS, we note the effect of a change (by one unit) of bank CDS spreads (sovereign CDS 
spreads) -after the announcement of the PSI- to the respective sovereign CDS spreads (bank CDS 
spreads). Since, the coefficient of INT is not statistically significant, we conclude that the effect of 
the independent variable to the corresponding equation, that we examine, has not changed. The 
bold letters in Table 16, show the coefficients for the countries in which long-term relation 
between the series, is observed. 
 We note, that in all cases, in which the coefficient of the dummy variable INT is 
statistically significant, there is a reduction in the influence of both bank CDS spreads to the 
respective countries, and vice versa. Specifically, we find that the effect of Greek, Portuguese, 
Spanish, Dutch and German bank CDS is limited to the government CDS spreads. There is also, a 
restriction of the effect of sovereign CDS of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, France and Germany in the 
corresponding bank CDS, in the period after the notification of the PSI program. For Greece, 
Portugal, and Germany, the interdependence between the CDS is reduced in both directions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the eurozone, the recent dramatic debt crisis has afflicted many countries, as a result of the 
global financial crisis that preceded it. This has led to the need for a bailout of many banking 
institutions, by European states, so as to avoid a collapse of the financial sector. This debt crisis 
has a direct effect on the notable growth of the sovereign credit risk. 
 The interdependence, between sovereign and bank default risk, has been extensively 
studied in the international literature of recent years. However, in our study, we focus on the 
development of this relationship, during the European debt crisis, by examining the CDS spreads 
of eight eurozone countries and of twenty-one banking institutions. We try to assess possible 
effects of this relationship, after the announcement of the voluntary exchange program of Greek 
bonds, with the participation of the private sector, which was announced at the Euro Summit of 
October 26, 2011. This program constitutes an innovation for the conservative eurozone, and is 
treated with extreme caution, by the international markets. 
 We study the period of 01/01/2009 to 30/05/2014. We divide the whole period into two 
sub-periods, with a structural point, the announcement of the PSI. By using Hsiao's methodology, 
and a Difference-in-Difference model, we examine the causality between the CDS spreads of the 
banks and the states. Based on the results obtained by calculating the FPEs, we infer that the 
interdependence between the CDS series in the second period, is restricted. Considering, at this 
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time, the differences of the minimum FPEs, we find that the magnitude of the interactions has 
decreased in seven cases, while having increased, in only two cases. In particular, the causality 
has been enhanced between the CDS of France and French banks, in both directions. 
 Similar are the results, after the assessment of the Difference-in-Difference model, 
concerning the size of the interactions, after the announcement of the PSI. We note a decline in 
the size, in ten out of the sixteen possible relations, in which the coefficient of the dummy 
variable INT is statistically significant, hence, we do not find an increase of the size in any 
relation. 
 It becomes imperative, the need for the undertaking of initiatives, by political and 
economic leaders of the eurozone, to aim to reduce the interdependence between sovereign 
and bank credit risk. This fact will contribute, not only, in strengthening the stability of the 
financial system, but, in improving the financial conditions of the European countries which are 
facing serious economic problems. As part of these initiatives, we conclude in our study, that the 
implementation of the PSI, has contributed to the limitation of the interdependence between 
CDS spreads of sovereigns and banks, in the period that follows the program. 
 In future research, we aim to extend our analysis by examining the interdependence 
between the credit risk of Greece and the other eurozone countries, and the banking institutions 
of the sample, independently, both before, and after, the announcement of the PSI. This should 
be very interesting, as many people consider the fiscal situation of Greece as the source of all evil 
in the eurozone. Furthermore, we will attempt to study the interdependence between the CDS 
spreads of the eurozone countries and banks, during the European debt crisis, into sub-periods, 
which will be determined endogenously by the data, based on the known structural break tests. 
We believe, that this approach will bring about remarkable findings. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: The sample of banking institutions 
 Banking Institutions 
GR_Banks 
National Bank of Greece 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 
Alpha Bank AE 
PT_Banks 
Banco Espirito Santo SA 
Banco Commercial Portugues  SA 
IT_Banks 
Mediobanca SpA 
Banca Popolare di Milano 
Banca Monte dei Paschi Siena 
SP_Banks 
Banco de Sabadell SA 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 
IR_Banks Bank of Ireland 
 
FR_Banks 
 
Natixis 
BNP Paribas SA 
Credit Agricole SA 
NL_Banks 
Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen  
Boerenleenbank B.A (Rabobank) 
F Van Lanschot Bankiers NY 
DE_Banks 
Commerzbank AG 
Deutsche Bank AG 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 
Bayerische Landesbank 
 Note: We weigh the banks in order to form the index of bank CDS spreads for each country, based on their 
total liabilities for each year. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the sovereign CDS spreads for the period 01/01/2009-26/10/2011. 
Variable Obs Mean(b.p) Std. Dev. Min(b.p) Max(b.p) Skewness  Kyrtosis 
GR 735 900.471 1168.948 100.270 6751.790 2.992 12.401 
PT 735 320.484 304.391 37.000 1227.890 1.368 3.986 
IT 735 141.667 79.053 48.000 482.041 1.908 6.734 
SP 735 158.266 76.903 47.000 378.816 0.606 2.539 
IR 735 356.871 237.855 96.925 1191.158 0.888 2.814 
FR 735 60.537 29.287 21.000 164.931 1.197 4.483 
NL 735 51.936 23.631 26.490 130.000 1.499 4.550 
DE 735 36.745 14.862 17.960 92.500 1.418 4.950 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the bank CDS spreads for the period 01/01/2009-26/10/2011. 
Variable Obs Mean(b.p) Std. Dev. Min(b.p) Max(b.p) Skewness  Kyrtosis 
GR_Banks 735 250.207 173.340 48.115 797.883 1.239 4.354 
PT_Banks 735 218.023 178.768 37.444 690.088 0.926 2.874 
IT_Banks 735 56.251 35.253 17.944 183.644 1.496 5.087 
SP_Banks 735 72.697 33.529 29.288 165.428 0.849 3.117 
IR_Banks 735 677.749 567.483 155.000 2298.981 1.233 3.397 
FR_Banks 735 40.567 14.588 21.063 103.983 1.726 6.475 
NL_Banks 735 45.384 15.751 25.653 106.039 1.605 5.184 
DE_Banks 735 30.077 8.167 17.303 63.035 1.322 5.046 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of the sovereign CDS spreads for the period 27/10/2011-30/05/2014. 
Variable Obs Mean(b.p) Std. Dev. Min(b.p) Max(b.p) Skewness  Kyrtosis 
GR 598 5311.117 5274.033 391.635 25960.760 1.153 3.898 
PT 677   557.908   348.214 143.950   1521.450 0.814 2.214 
IT 677    249.677   106.216   87.730     498.660 0.593 2.324 
SP 677    233.470   106.313   62.830     492.070 0.332 2.306 
IR 677    261.511   212.750   48.650     729.190 0.842 2.089 
FR 677     62.667     36.960   25.790    171.560 1.016 2.769 
NL 677     65.117     30.514   28.460     133.840 0.749 2.103 
DE 677     24.633     15.484     9.160       72.350 1.264 3.522 
 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of the bank CDS spreads for the period 27/10/2011-30/05/2014. 
Variable Obs Mean(b.p) Std. Dev. Min(b.p) Max(b.p) Skewness  Kyrtosis 
GR_Banks 677 476.853 214.784 177.048 859.490 0.411 1.708 
PT_Banks 677 322.845 172.938 85.830 799.676 0.783 2.655 
IT_Banks 677 152.059    45.783 51.001 259.746 -0.352 2.523 
SP_Banks 677 121.020    50.464 36.179 230.199 0.119 2.095 
IR_Banks 677 551.540 340.559 163.990 1530.140 1.037 3.369 
FR_Banks 677    58.613 23.500 21.570 118.198 0.442 2.298 
NL_Banks 677    49.499 12.447 25.274 79.465 0.326 2.332 
DE_Banks 677    35.784 12.448 17.828 80.195 0.752 2.616 
 
 
Table 6: Pair-wise correlations between the log-differences of sovereign and bank CDS spreads. 
 1st period 2nd period 
GR-GR_Banks 0.3283 0.0554 
PT-PT_Banks 0.6361 0.3502 
IT-IT_Banks 0.6607 0.6261 
SP-SP_Banks 0.6691 0.5783 
IR-IR_Banks 0.3103 0.1392 
FR-FR_Banks 0.6190 0.5085 
NL-NL_Banks 0.4254 0.3582 
DE-DE_Banks 0.4991 0.3418 
Note: The first period is from 01/01/2009 to 26/10/2011, and the second period is from 27/10/2011 to 
30/05/2014. 
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Table 7: Unit root test results for sovereign CDS - 1st period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We examine the data for the existence of unit root by the tests PP, ADF, KPSS. The PP and ADF 
tests consider the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. On the contrary KPPS test examines 
the null hypothesis of stationarity. Period 1 ranges from 01/01/2009 to 26/10/2011. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Unit root test results for bank CDS -1st period  
Bank CDS 
spreads 
Log prices in levels  Log prices in first differences 
PP ADF KPSS  PP  ADF KPSS 
GR_Banks  0.866 -0.006 1.29*    -22.853* -4.379* 0.2050 
PT_Banks -0.400 -0.530 1.13*   -20.926* -6.594* 0.0526 
IT_Banks -0.179 -0.079 1.61* -23.202* -8.633* 0.0546 
SP_Banks -0.647 -0.736 1.33* -20.362* -5.930* 0.0460 
IR_Banks -0.646 -0.809 2.78* -26.501* -5.350*   0.1320* 
FR_Banks -1.172 -1.179 1.27* -21.067* -6.261* 0.0287 
NL_Banks -1.986   -1.765** 1.44* -21.975* -8.209* 0.0496 
DE_Banks -1.437 -1.190 1.46* -22.294* -5.942* 0.2050 
Note: We examine the data for the existence of unit root by the tests PP, ADF, KPSS. The PP and ADF 
tests consider the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. On the contrary KPPS test examines 
the null hypothesis of stationarity. Period 1 ranges from 01/01/2009 to 26/10/2011. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
Sov CDS 
spreads 
Log prices in levels  Log prices in first differences 
PP ADF KPSS  PP  ADF KPSS 
GR   0.815  0.595   0.985* -20.414* -5.816* 0.0637 
PT -0.201 -0.045  1.210* -21.563* -6.994* 0.0496 
IT -1.124 -0.650  1.010* -20.963* -9.490* 0.0371 
SP -1.221 -0.985   0.924* -22.400* -6.466* 0.0343 
IR -0.735 -0.449  2.520* -22.407* -5.779* 0.0596 
FR -0.881 -0.813  1.050* -21.086* -11.299* 0.0483 
NL -1.518   -2.335*  1.510* -20.885* -5.634* 0.0521 
DE -2.079    -2.152**  1.250* -24.097* -9.765* 0.0330 
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Table 9: Unit root test results for sovereign CDS - 2nd period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We examine the data for the existence of unit root by the tests PP, ADF, KPSS. The PP and ADF 
tests consider the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. On the contrary KPPS test examines 
the null hypothesis of stationarity. Period 2 ranges from 27/10/2011 to 30/05/2014. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 10: Unit root test results for bank CDS - 2nd period  
Bank CDS 
spreads 
Log prices in levels Log prices in first differences 
PP ADF KPSS  PP  ADF KPSS 
GR_Banks  0.503  0.211 0.537*    -31.107* -6.272* 0.0615 
PT_Banks -0.226 -0.281 0.969*   -24.671* -7.639* 0.1050 
IT_Banks  0.453  0.104 1.860* -20.027* -5.358* 0.0526 
SP_Banks  0.506  0.039 1.790* -21.587* -4.873* 0.0447 
IR_Banks -0.632 -0.713 0.559* -25.737* -5.430* 0.0670 
FR_Banks -0.321  0.062 0.815* -20.659* -5.670* 0.0281 
NL_Banks -0.302 -0.418 0.554* -23.348* -5.013* 0.0597 
DE_Banks -0.823 -0.704 0.521* -20.990* -5.509* 0.0312 
Note:  We examine the data for the existence of unit root by the tests PP, ADF, KPSS. The PP and ADF 
tests consider the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root. On the contrary KPPS test examines 
the null hypothesis of stationarity. Period 2 ranges from 27/10/2011 to 30/05/2014. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Sov CDS 
spreads 
Log prices in levels  Log prices in first differences 
PP ADF KPSS  PP  ADF KPSS 
GR   0.735  0.372 - -23.700*  3.886* - 
PT -0.292 -0.460 1.07* -20.676* -6.402* 0.0749 
IT -0.554  0.073   0.586* -21.765* -6.424* 0.0269 
SP   0.331  1.009 1.64* -22.630* -5.807* 0.0023 
IR -0.577 -0.374 1.44* -27.288* -5.973* 0.0699 
FR -1.398 -1.175 1.70* -25.372* -7.506* 0.0204 
NL -0.512 -0.336   0.845* -22.687* -5.924* 0.0737 
DE -1.612  -1.575*** 1.55* -25.068* -6.377* 0.0302 
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Table 11: Bivariate cointegration tests for sovereign and bank CDS spreads -1st period 
Variables Lags 
Trace test Maximum Eigenvalue test 
r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 
GR-GR_Banks 2 24.4985   0.0524* 24.4985   0.0524* 
PT-PT_Banks 2 19.1222   0.4661* 18.6561   0.4661* 
IT-IT_Banks 2   15.2359*   0.1347* 15.1012   0.1347* 
SP-SP_Banks 3 25.7194   1.9372* 23.7822   1.9372* 
IR-IR_Banks 2 36.1700   0.6809* 35.4891   0.6809* 
FR-FR_Banks 2 15.4393   2.8144*  12.6250*   2.8144* 
NL-NL_Banks 2 16.3120 4.7085  11.6035* 4.7085 
DE-DE_Banks 2   14.8135* 5.3651    9.4484* 5.3651 
Note: The table presents the results from the Johansen's trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for the period 
from 01/01/2009 to 26/10/2011. r denotes the null hypothesis. The control is performed at the 5% significance 
level. 
 
 
Table 12: Bivariate cointegration tests for sovereign and bank CDS spreads-2nd period 
Μ τα λητές Lags 
Trace test Maximum eigenvalue  
r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 
GR-GR_Banks 2     8.6006* 1.1925*       7.4081* 1.1925* 
PT-PT_Banks 2     7.0834* 0.0073*       7.0761* 0.0073* 
IT-IT_Banks 2    10.6103* 0.5055*   10.1048 0.5055* 
SP-SP_Banks 2  19.5326 0.0595*   19.4731 0.0595* 
IR-IR_Banks 4     5.7496* 0.2844*      5.4652* 0.2844* 
FR-FR_Banks 2     8.1341* 0.5715*      7.5626* 0.5715* 
NL-NL_Banks 2     9.2149* 0.1993*      9.0156* 0.1993* 
DE-DE_Banks 2     7.2251* 1.5431*      5.6820* 1.5431* 
Note: The table presents the results from the Johansen's trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for the period 
from 27/10/2011-30/05/2014. r denotes the null hypothesis. The control is performed at the 5% significance 
level. 
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Table 13: Causality test results - 1st period   
Controlled 
variable 
Manipulated 
variable 
FPE (κ,0) FPE (κ,λ) Causality 
GR GR_Banks 
0.00219825 
(17,0) 
0.00218050 
(17,6) 
YES 
PT PT_Banks 
0.00303824 
(18,0) 
0.00304274 
(18,9) 
NO 
IT IT_Banks 
0.00317368 
(4,0) 
0.00315099 
(4,2) 
YES 
SP SP_Banks 
0.00303811 
(18,0) 
0.00301316 
(18,2) 
YES 
IR IR_Banks 
0.00193204 
(21,0) 
0.00193724 
(21,1) 
NO 
FR FR_Banks 
0.00220502 
(6,0) 
0.00217854 
(6,3) 
YES 
NL NL_Banks 
0.00153231 
(18,0) 
0.00149575 
(18,3) 
YES 
DE DE_Banks 
0.00315966 
(7,0) 
0.00313170 
(7,1) 
YES 
GR_Banks GR 
0.00545950 
(9,0) 
0.00510580 
(9,8) 
YES 
PT_Banks PT 
0.00138089 
(20,0) 
0.00130616 
(20,3) 
YES 
IT_Banks IT 
0.00154072 
(18,0) 
0.00148333 
(18,1) 
YES 
SP_Banks SP 
0.00104837 
(13,0) 
0.00101556 
(13,4) 
YES 
IR_Banks IR 
0.00187015 
(9,0) 
0.00184361 
(9,12) 
YES 
FR_Banks FR 
0.00141545 
(4,0) 
0.00140875 
(4,6) 
YES 
NL_Banks NL 
0.00082783 
(14,0) 
0.00080951 
(14,2) 
YES 
DE_Banks DE 
 0.001218245 
(5,0) 
0.00117958 
(5,24) 
YES 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of lags which give us the minimum FPEs for each 
variable. The first period is from 01/01/2009 to 26/10/2011. 
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Table 14: Causality test results - 2nd period   
Note: The numbers in the parentheses indicate the number of lags which give us the minimum FPEs for each 
variable. The second period is from 27/11/2011 to 30/05/2014. 
  
Controlled 
variable 
Manipulated 
variable 
FPE (κ,0) FPE (κ,λ) Causality 
GR GR_Banks 
0.00410056 
(17,0) 
0.00409601 
(17,9) 
YES 
PT PT_Banks 
0.00090126 
(2,0) 
0.00090725 
(2,7) 
NO 
IT IT_Banks 
0.00122756 
(2,0) 
0.00122807 
(2,1) 
NO 
SP SP_Banks 
0.00128335 
(5,0) 
0.00128255 
(5,5) 
YES 
IR IR_Banks 
0.00086333 
(17,0) 
0.00084315 
(17,5) 
YES 
FR FR_Banks 
0.00202591 
(18,0) 
0.00195837 
(18,1) 
YES 
NL NL_Banks 
0.00068997 
(1,0) 
0.00069156 
(1,1) 
NO 
DE DE_Banks 
0.00227849 
(1,0) 
0.00228224 
(1,4) 
NO 
GR_Banks GR 
0.00039583 
(2,0) 
0.00035991 
(2,20) 
YES 
PT_Banks PT 
0.00057258 
(3,0) 
0.00056300 
(3,1) 
YES 
IT_Banks IT 
0.00062229 
(1,0) 
0.00061853 
(1,1) 
YES 
SP_Banks SP 
0.00056732 
(1,0) 
0.00056099 
(1,1) 
YES 
IR_Banks IR 
0.00036660 
(3,0) 
0.00036350 
(3,3) 
YES 
FR_Banks FR 
0.00086041 
(1,0) 
0.00085228 
(1,10) 
YES 
NL_Banks NL 
0.00061579 
(1,0) 
0.00061838 
(1,1) 
NO 
DE_Banks DE 
0.00077597 
(1,0) 
0.00077930 
(1,1) 
NO 
 
31 
 
Table 15: Change of the interdependence  
Note: It presents the changes in causality for CDS time series which have a causal relationship in both periods. 
The first period is from 01/01/2009 to 26/10/2011, and the second period ranges from 27/10/2011 to 
30/05/2014. 
 
Controlled 
variable 
Manipulated 
variable 
1st period 
FPE (κ,0)- FPE (κ,λ) 
2nd period 
FPE (κ,0)- FPE (κ,λ) 
Interdependence 
GR GR_Banks 0.000017750 0.00000455 ↓ 
SP SP_Banks 0.000024950 0.00000080 ↓ 
FR FR_Banks 0.000026480 0.00006754 ↑ 
GR_Banks GR 0.000353700 0.00003592 ↓ 
PT_Banks PT 0.000074730 0.00000958 ↓ 
IT_Banks IT 0.000057390 0.00000376 ↓ 
SP_Banks SP 0.000032810 0.00000633 ↓ 
IR_Banks IR 0.000026540 0.00000310 ↓ 
FR_Banks FR 0.000006700 0.00000813 ↑ 
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Table 16: Difference-in-Difference results 
Controlled variable 
Manipulated 
variable 
Coefficient of 
ΙNT 
Interdependence 
GR GR_Banks   -0.4722166* 
(p=0.001) 
↓ 
PT PT_Banks -0.465363* 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
IT IT_Banks -0.0708884 
(p=0.268) 
- 
SP SP_Banks -0.267937* 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
IR IR_Banks -0.100114 
(p=0.229) 
- 
FR FR_Banks  0.0040141 
(p=0.948) 
- 
NL NL_Banks   -0.2081213* 
(p=0.001) 
↓ 
DE DE_Banks       -0.2190613*** 
(p=0.007) 
↓ 
GR_Banks GR   -0.1467038* 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
PT_Banks PT   -0.1611431* 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
IT_Banks IT -0.0104278 
(p=0.749) 
- 
SP_Banks SP -0.0079284 
(p=0.778) 
- 
IR_Banks IR -0.2038485 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
FR_Banks FR   -0.1651172* 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
NL_Banks NL  0.0305242 
(p=0.482) 
- 
DE_Banks DE   -0.1105608* 
(p=0.000) 
↓ 
Note: We regress the equation (7) and we receive the coefficients of the dummy variable INT. We test for 
the significance of these coefficients based on the p-values. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
  
